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Towards 'Participative' Multinational 
Malcolm Warner 
and 
Riccardo Peccei 
/ / the labour movement is strong, this may not only 
simultanéously make for more effective participation at the 
National plant levels, but also via pressure on the State, to 
very much limit the rôle of the multi-national corporations. 
In récent years, the policies of multi-national firms hâve become 
an important focus of both political discussion and académie research. 
In particular, critical opinion and organised labour hâve expressed 
growing concern over the impact of multi-national companies on em-
ployment levels, wages and conditions of work, and on the structure 
and composition of the labour force. In addition, and even more fun-
damentally, trade unions hâve criticised the way in which multi-national 
firms conduct their industrial relations and the way in which they make 
important policy décisions, in which by implication it seems they hâve 
little chance to participate either formally or informally. 
PARTICIPATION AND MANAGEMENT IN MULTI-NATIONAL CORPORATIONS (MNC) 
Whatever previous commentators hâve pointed out, the very 
posing of the question of whether MNC's challenge national sovereign-
ty, in itself implies that the country in which the MNC opérâtes has 
its own laws, and thèse must be complied with. The MNC, it is said, 
has to operate according to their laws and in varying degrees the culture 
of both this and their country of origin. By and large, most MNC's 
do this across the board, and in particular with respect to the laws 
relating to worker participation. It will be noted in a récent case con-
cerning union récognition, that one 
well-known American-owned firm 
had not yet corne to terms in this 
sensé with the unions in the United 
Kingdom, but had been obliged 
to do so in Sweden and Germany, 
presumably because of légal obliga-
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tions. As far as Britain is now concerned, with the change in the law, 
there is little question of it being able to évade its responsibility in 
this direction. The fact that conformity is apparent vis-a-vis the law 
of course does not mean that there is anything beyond passive 
acquiescence in many cases. Nonetheless, the fact remains that in 
Germany, for example, corporations whatever their country of origin, 
whether German or foreign, hâve to hâve a workers' council if they 
fall into the catégories laid down by the revised acts of 1972 and 1974. 
Some MNCs may however attempt to change the law both at home 
and abroad, the latter being in the country of opération for example, 
Germany or Turkey, whatever the character of the labour law. This is 
clearly an active stance, and may take the form of challenging a partic-
ular pièce of législation concerning worker participation in the Courts 
specifically, or indeed a gênerai principle in the broader discussion 
concerning any revision of institutional arrangements. They may do this 
individually or through some collective représentation, like the Amer-
ican Chamber of Commerce in Germany challenging the extension of 
worker représentation on supervisory boards in German industry. They 
may do it overtly or covertly. They may do it by open political lobbying, 
by the use of pressure groups, or by diplomatie channels. They may 
try to influence public opinion by placing advertisements in newspapers 
in the country concerned or indirectly financing campaigns through 
«front» bodies to indirectly affect législative outeomes. At the présent 
time certain British companies are worried about proposed législation 
concerning worker représentation at board level on the parent company 
in the country of origin. One of the arguments being used is that this 
will lead to workers in their foreign subsidiaries being unrepresented 
on the board and with the implication that this is unfair. What they 
probably fear is that the workers on the British parent-board may not 
sanction the export of jobs to countries with low labour costs, or tol-
erate certain practices which perpetuate payment of low wages and the 
maintenance of poor conditions in such countries. In the British case 
this is not merely a question of the MNC changing the law on participa-
tion, but even trying to prevent a law introducing such participation 
coming into being. 
The MNC has to décide whether to be conformist or déviant vis-
a-vis the culture of the country in which it is operating: if it is the 
former, then this is a passive position. It can be argued that this is a 
final stage of equilibrium, as we hâve argued elsewhere (see Warner et 
al, 1973), where the MNC establishes itself in a particular country and 
attempts to operate as if it were still at home in its industrial relations 
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behaviour, but soon finds that this produces many difficultés, and 
«settles down» eventually. This may corne about with or without lég-
islative enforcement, as it may receive adverse publicity from attempting 
to run its affairs as if it were still, for example, operating in Détroit, 
as some argue has been the case with certain American car rnanufac-
turers producing in the British market. Whether coming to terms with 
trade unions is necessary a good thing from the point of view of man-
ufacturing efficiency, and/or profit making is another question. Where 
there is considérable nationalism in the country of opération, even 
without the law forcing the MNC to introduce participation, it may feel 
that it should do so even for the sake of a good public-relations image. 
Another reason why an MNC may wish to appear to adapt to the 
contemporary industrial relations culture particularly as far as participa-
tion is concerned, may be that it wishes to anticipate coming législation, 
and/or appear to be 'progressive' vis-a-vis government, particularly 
where it is seeking financial support from the state, as has been the 
case in the récent example of Chrysler UK Limited 
Further, where the law specifically institutionalises «participation» 
the MNC has to comply, and this is a very spécifie passive rôle. This 
is a pafticular instance falling under the second point we hâve discussed 
above, that it is very directly related to those countries which hâve 
rather developed worker participation institutions, as opposed to rather 
minimal législation. A good example hère would be Yugoslavia, where 
many firms, often American, set up «joint ventures», which are firms 
operating in Yugoslavia but which are jointly owned by the MNC and 
Yugoslav enterprise concerned, the latter having 51% of the share, and 
controlling the policy. Nonetheless the joint venture has 100% Yugoslav-
style self-management arrangements, (see Warner, 1975). 
Where the MNC opérâtes in a culture which encourages partic-
ipative practices, it may tend to conform and this is a passive rôle. 
This proposition is akin to the one above which suggests that a final 
equilibrium position will ultimately be achieved in the sensé that the 
firm will «settle down» in the industrial relations culture in which it 
finds itself. This does not necessarily imply that there is an institution-
alisation of participation, but there may be forces such as a highly 
educated labour force, a highly organised labour movement, and egal-
itarian norms in the culture which may exert pressures on foreign firms 
operating there to manage their affairs in a relatively more participative 
manner than they might do either at home or in another country. This 
may take place at différent levels, and may directly affect the way in 
which managers themselves participate in decision-making. An example 
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of this may be that an American firm operating in Japan, may hâve to 
go along with the consensus management style of Japanese enterprises, 
as it is, or may be using Japanese managers, although there is not 
necessarily institutionalised workers' participation in Japan. 
Again, where the MNC has developed a «participative» structure 
and/or culture at home it may try to «export» it, and we can definitely 
regard this as an active rôle for the purposes of our analysis. It is 
certainly true to say that many American M N C s hâve a particular 
management style which is often relatively more 'progressive' with 
respect to human relations type management, and they take it with them 
when they set-up business in overseas areas. Whether or not we can 
call this «participative» is another question, but we do often find 
examples of the replication of such structures and/or climates in or-
ganisations operating in countries abroad. This particular factor may run 
counter to the passive rôles set out in the propositions above, in the 
sensé that we hâve hère structures and/or processes which are imposed 
rather than adaptations to local laws and/or culture. An example of 
this is a company like IBM which tends to hâve a style which it uni-
formally attempts to operate with throughout the world; another ex-
ample may be the Ford Motor Company, and so on. When the MNC 
starts up opérations abroad, it is not only taking with it the «hard» 
technology relevant to its sphère of opérations, but also the «soft» 
technology of managing the capital involved. We are not so much 
concerned with the former hère, but with the latter which of course 
will either promote or in many cases hinder either participative struc-
tures and/or processes. As far as the former is concerned, the techno-
logical constraints may, if the determinists are to be believed, limit 
the range of control-structures which can be implemented; nonetheless, 
we find that there seems to be very little limitation as far as the range 
of technologies introduced into, say, joint venture companies, which as 
we hâve seen above hâve locally prescribed control-structures at least 
as far as their formai characteristics are concerned. 
As the MNC is likely to be large (global) it may 'export' its internai 
culture because it is more formalised than national companies, and this 
can be regarded as an active stance. If it has adopted a Worldwide 
style, it may simply impose this via a highly developed manual of operat-
ing pratices, and this quite often will run counter to, if not national 
laws, then local culture in the sensé of custom and practice. If the style 
being exported is participative then it will be less likely to clash; if it 
is non-participative, or participative in a différent sensé from that of 
the indigenous culture, then there will be conflict. 
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Other things being equal, the MNC being larger than national 
firms, will hâve more difficulty in adapting to both local laws and cul-
ture, and this may be taken as an active stance as in.the proposition 
above. The fact that it is larger will mean that its structure is denser, 
and that there is a higher degree of bureaucratisation via formalisation, 
standardisation, and spécialisation. On the other hand research (see 
Child, 1972; Hickson et al, 1974) has suggested that thèse factors are 
highly correlated with décentralisation as companies become larger, and 
therefore managers at local levels may hâve the ability to take décisions 
which may possibly lead in the direction of adaptation, although given 
the wide use of operating manuals in American-owned M N C s World-
wide, this may not necessarily mean that they will fit into the industrial 
relations culture any more easily. Whether or not the key décisions 
are centralised for a wide range of activities in an objective sensé is 
irrelevant if it is widely believed by at least those employées organised 
into trade unions, that «ail décisions are made in Détroit». Even if there 
is conformity to both national participative institutions, and culture, 
there may well nonetheless be a feeling that the participation is a sham. 
It is possible that the MNC will be likely to corne into conflict 
with local pressures especially where thèse originate via « participative » 
institutions, and this can be regarded as an active stance. This is analyt-
ically separate from the proposition considered above in the sensé that 
it is not simply a question of the MNC conforming to the law or cul-
ture, but actually having to deal with local pressures resulting from 
active opposition to company policy originating in the works council 
or through worker directors on boards. The pressure may also resuit 
via collective bargaining bodies. 
Last, it may be hypothesised that the MNC is more likely to be 
pro-active than reactive as far as the question of participation is con-
cerned, as a gênerai principle, as it is directly concerned with not only 
managerial authority in the subsidiary itself, but also the basic de facto 
sovereignty of the parent company. We can conjecture that in more 
cases than not, the MNC will positively try to avoid having such con-
straints in the form of participative institutions it might hâve to deal 
with. 
One clue to a more profound understanding of the factors dis-
cussed above is to examine the objectives of the multi-national enter-
prise. One observer (Vernon, 1971) in discussing thèse objectives 
concèdes that the multi-national enterprises covered in his study are 
nearly identical with the largest US corporations, and that «ail génér-
alisations on the subject of corporate behaviour represent a heroic sim-
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plification of reality» (1971: 115-116). He goes on to say that in the 
course of his study, «the simplifying model of the behaviour of large 
US corporations that has proved most useful is one quite far removed 
from the classical model» (1971: 116). The characteristics he describes 
of oligopoliste compétition, uncertainty in the decision-making process, 
the « sheer size and diversity of thèse entities» (1971: 117), etc lead 
him to conclude that thèse firms are différent from small businesses in 
their essential nature, and he concludes that they often given, «the 
impression of a group of co-operating forces joined together in one or-
ganization but managing to retain distinguishably différent goals within 
it» (1971: 117). 
It order to weld together the various parts of this glomeration to 
respond to problems in a way that is consistent with its collective goals, 
an organizational structure has to develop of a very spécial kind. The 
resuit, brilliantly described by Vernon, leads to a way of reaping the 
benefits of an international division of activity but at the same time 
resolving the problem of internai supervision. As he puts it, «Out of this 
metamorphosis, the various main organizational forms emerged. Some 
were based mainly on a geographical breakdown, some mainly on a 
product-basis, and others on a mixture in which neither clearly pre-
dominated», (1971:128). If the corporation had comparatively few 
products it retained its international division and if it had a wide range 
of products it seemed drawn to a structure of a more complex kind. 
The main conséquence with the discussion we hâve been involved in 
concerning multi-nationals and participation, is that whether a product-
centered or area-centred scheme of organization is adopted, the identity 
of the subsidiary extends beyond the boundaries of the spécifie country 
involved. The form of organization is that of the enterprise's invention 
and not that as laid down by the State. Thus we hâve a principal sour-
ce of tension between the multinational corporation and the State, but 
even more importantly for our discussion, the various forces that are 
contained within the State, including organized labour. 
When we are discussing the collective goals of the multi-national 
corporation, it may well be the State and that contained within it may 
wish to pursue quite différent goals, or at least qualify the goals which 
the corporation claims to be pursuing. Moreover there may be disagree-
ment about the means by which a commonly agreed end may be achiev-
ed. Given that the main rôle of the multi-national corporation is in the 
first instance with the development of strategy and the co-ordination 
of control, and if a product form of organization is adopted, there can 
be real conflicts between the headquarters country of the MNC and any 
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national unit or its parts. Where there is a régional form of organiza-
tion, the problem may be lëss severe insofar as participation structures 
could be set up for say the European area group, and it is certainly 
envisaged when the «European» multi-national company is ultimately 
set-up that it will hâve a European-wide works council as well as spé-
cifie councils in individual national plants. But in this particular direc-
tion, it is still early days. 
Whether there is product or régional forms of organization within 
the MNC, the perception of the enterprise will usually be différent from 
that of governments insofar as perceiving the ultimate déterminant of 
authority, (see Vernon, 171:131). At the moment the perception of 
organized labour in individual countries is usually based on the identity 
of national interests, and therefore coincides with that of the State. 
There is some movement towards labour seeing thèse factors operating 
at a higher international level (see e.g. the writings of Levinson 1972; 
Warner et al, 1973). Nonetheless the main discussion for some time to 
corne will essentially focus on participation in national subsidiaries of 
MNC's, and indeed in individual plants. 
DECISION-MAKING, DECENTRALIZATION AND PARTICIPATION 
Insofar as we hâve reviewed research findings in the field, and 
indeed carried out research ourselves in a large British-based MNC, 
(see Peccei and Warner, 1977), we hâve corne to the conclusion that 
certain décision-making areas are explicitly centralized, for example, 
finance and the appointment of senior personnel ; and in addition several 
others may be apparently decentralized, but there may well be a latent 
degree of control exercised and implicit in the very nature of decen-
tralization and délégation. 
The first strategy is to attempt to retain as much control as possi-
ble over financial décisions, such as capital investments and wages. 
This tendency will increase as the économie environment becomes more 
problematic. The extent to which headquarters is able to centralize thèse 
types of décisions varies depending on size of subsidiary. The fact that 
financial décisions are among the most centralized issues irrespective of 
size of unit, however, suggests that control over thèse types of questions 
is particularly important to headquarters. This is an accordance with 
previous findings in the literature suggesting that thèse are indeed critical 
areas of decision-making over which top management usually attempts, 
and often succeeds, in retaining quite a substantial degree of control. 
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(See for example, Brooke and Remmers, 1970). In this connection, in 
fact, it may be suggested that in order to contain risks within acceptable 
limits it is not necessary for headquarters to centralize to hâve quite a 
high degree of autonomy over a whole séries of IR issues as long as 
it is able to retain a fair degree of control over a few critical areas 
of decision-making. 
The second strategy for reducing risk is through the process of 
sélection of personnel. It is in this context that we are to understand 
the emphasis which is placed on the appointment of senior managers 
in large units. The fact that this is the most centralized décision in 
large subsidiaries suggests that in order to reduce risks headquarters 
may hâve to do more than jsut retain a substantial degree of control 
over financial décisions. A second line of defence is needed. Given that 
local managers in stratégie plants are in a position to become relatively 
autonomous, one of the ways in which headquarters can reduce the pos-
sible risks involved in such a situation is be retaining control over the 
appointment of local managers. By doing so headquarters can insure that 
the managers in charge of subsidiaries are in fact chosen in terms of 
certain criteria of compétence and loyalty thus reducing the risks involv-
ed in having to operate within a more decentralized System of decision-
making. 
Board policy in regard to employée participation was summarised 
as follows : 
« To ensure that its management is educated and keeps itself informed on 
ail aspects of participation. 
To organise the exchange of knowledge Worldwide. 
To require ail units to specify in the business plans the kinds and degree 
of participation they propose and to relate their proposais to the commonly 
accepted level of practices in the country and industry concerned. 
To encourage such participation, including new initiatives, as local unit 
management feels confident will lead to better results and greater satisfac-
tion for employées.» 
This officiai description of company policy appears to be congruent 
with the twin stratégies described eariier, and indeed the spokesman 
invoked the socialization mechanism involving senior personnel by 
which policy on participation was co-ordinated : 
«(At) our Group Management Training Centre,... employée participation 
has been receiving a lot of attention in the programmes followed there and 
on other courses at ail levels held elsewhere. The management in our operat-
ing companies are well aware of the need to develop the pattern most 
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appropriate to their local context and indeed many would claim that a par-
ticipative style has been evolving as a normal process of good management 
for some time past. However, in gênerai it is too early to expect anything 
much in the nature of case historiés and we would not wish to press our 
managers in this regard. » 
Three points emerged from our empirical investigation, as follows: 
(a) The company's plants based in Western Europe appeared to be 
significantly more autonomous than the subsidiaries based in the 
UK, making the same product. 
(b) In the case of almost every décision, in fact, managers in the 
European plants enjoy a greater degree of autonomy than do their 
counterparts in the UK. 
(c) A further important point which émerges from our data is that 
foreign-based and UK subsidiaries also differ in terms of their 
pattern of centralization. Apart from the appointment of senior 
managers, the type of décisions which are most centralized varies 
depending on the location of the subsidiary. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Even if it can be demonstrated that considérable manageria au-
tonomy exists at the country and/or plant level, and indeed that the 
acceptance of participation structures there constitutes further de-
centralization, it nonetheless remains likely that the parameters of policy 
are set at the very highest level in the MNC's structures, especially 
in the key areas we hâve discussed, and that although such attempts 
at worker participation may be very often a source of irritation to 
the MNC and indeed worse still perceived as potentially very subver-
sive, in reality their countervailing power may be very circumscribed. 
On other hand, decision-making is more complex and fragmented 
than many observers believe. 
We are forced to conclude that the most potentially effective 
countervailing power may be that of organized labour in the national 
country. If the labour movement is strong, this may not only simul-
taneously make for more effective participation at the national subsid-
iary/plant levels, but also via pressure on the State, to very much limit 
the rôle of the MNC. But one can agrée with Vernon (1971:249) that 
differing social Systems and the MNC are not necessarily incompatible. 
Again, where there is a strong organized labour movement, in a multi-
party social-democratic society, such as Israël or indeed the Scandi-
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navian countries, the MNC's and worker participation can peacefully 
co-exist. Further, the power of organized labour internationally may 
affect the policy-level decision-making of the MNC's (see Levinson, 
1972), particularly in the future. If indeed the European Draft Company 
Statute is eventually implemented, there may be a Works Council & 
Worker Directors on Group-level Supervisory Boards to directly affect 
policy at the highest levels, rather than with respect to décisions al-
ready decentralized from headquarters-country. But the Commission has 
also proposed for collective agreements to be concluded between the 
European multi-national and the unions represented in its plants. The 
national works council would continue to operate and to carry out the 
tasks not covered by the European Works Council. This is probably 
a sensible solution, but the problem of représentation at the highest 
level remains and is unresolved, as is the question of non-European 
multi-nationals. Whatever the formai constraints developed by either the 
EEC, or UN agencies (such as the ILO), the labour movement would 
be wise to develop its own constraints both nationally and internation-
ally. 
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Syndicats et multinationales 
L'Auteur de cet article étudie le comportement des sociétés multinationales en 
pays étranger, sujet qui a suscité, depuis quelques années, beaucoup de débats «poli-
tiques» et de recherches approfondies. D'une façon particulière, les critiques et les syn-
dicats ont montré un grand intérêt touchant l'influence de ces entreprises sur le taux de 
l'emploi, les salaires et les conditions de travail ainsi que sur la structure et la com-
position de la main-d'œuvre. En outre, les syndicats ont critiqué la manière dont elles 
traitaient leurs employés et la façon dont elles prenaient leurs décisions en matière 
de relations de travail. 
La question fondamentale consiste à savoir comment la multinationale réagit 
vis-à-vis la législation et la culture du pays où elle s'implante. D'une façon générale, 
elle a tendance à respecter la législation du travail, pour peu que les lois soient assez 
strictes. Toutefois, cette obéissance est plutôt passive. Quelques-unes, cependant, 
s'efforcent d'obtenir des modifications aux lois ou à certaines des stipulations qu'elles 
contiennent. Elles le font individuellement ou par l'intermédiaire des organismes patro-
naux existants, les chambres de commerce par exemple. Elles peuvent le faire ouverte-
ment ou en catimini, faire du lobbying politique, mettre en branle des groupes de pres-
sion ou agir à travers les canaux diplomatiques. 
Elles peuvent aussi tenter d'influencer l'opinion publique par la publication d'an-
nonces dans la presse ou en finançant certaines campagnes d'action politique. 
Lorsqu'une multinationale s'installe dans un pays, elle essaie d'abord de fonc-
tionner comme si elle était chez elle en matière de relations de travail, mais si les cho-
ses ne vont pas, elle s'assagit bientôt devant les critiques que son comportement soulè-
ve, la crainte de se voir imposer des restrictions légales ou d'être mal considérée dans 
l'opinion publique. Ainsi, elle cherchera à s'entendre avec les syndicats de façon à 
assurer l'efficacité de la production; de même, dans les pays à fortes tendances na-
tionalistes, elle se montrera prudente de façon à conserver son image; elle tâchera 
enfin d'anticiper les événements à venir, principalement dans les milieux où l'on prô-
ne la participation du personnel à la vie de l'entreprise. Si le degré de participation est 
déjà assez marquée dans son pays d'origine, elle ira jusqu'à prendre les devants. Con-
cernant les pratiques administratives, elle adoptera le style de direction commun au 
pays où elle s'établit. D'ailleurs, le comportement est différent d'une multinationale à 
l'autre. 
L'Auteur observe aussi que, si la multinationale est plus grande que les entrepri-
ses locales, elle aura plus de difficulté à s'adapter aux lois et à la culture du pays, 
surtout parce que sa structure est plus dense, qu'elle est davantage «bureaucratisée». 
En règle générale, la première stratégie de la multinationale consiste à garder 
le meilleur contrôle possible sur les décisions financières, comme les investissements et 
les salaires. Cette tendance s'accentuera quand la situation économique devient plus 
problématique. Le degré de centralisation varie selon l'importance de la subsidiaire. 
Quand la chose s'impose, le quartier général laisse une certaine marge d'autonomie à 
la direction locale. 
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La deuxième stratégie consiste à réduire les risques en contrôlant le processus de 
la sélection du personnel. C'est dans ce sens qu'il nous faut comprendre l'attention qui 
est apportée au choix des cadres supérieurs à l'intérieur des grandes unités. Une seconde 
ligne de défense est nécessaire. Étant donné que les gérants locaux dans les établisse-
ments considérables se trouvent en position de devenir relativement autonomes, une 
des façons pour le siège social de diminuer les risques est de garder la maîtrise de dési-
gnation de ces gérants. En agissant ainsi, le siège social peut s'assurer que les gérants 
des subsidiaires sont choisis selon certains critères de compétence et de loyauté, ce 
qui diminue les risques d'émancipation lorsque la prise des décisions doit être décentra-
lisée. 
L'Auteur estime que, même s'il est démontré qu'il est accordé beaucoup d'auto-
nomie dans les sociétés multinationales à la direction locale ou au niveau d'un pays 
donné, il n'en reste pas moins que les paramètres politiques sont établis aux plus hauts 
degrés de la structure de la multinationale, et que la participation des travailleurs à la 
direction peut être considérée comme très subversive. Cependant, la politique décision-
nelle est plus complexe et plus fragmentée que ne le pensent beaucoup d'observateurs, 
de sorte qu'il faut conclure que le mouvement syndical peut la contrebalancer. Lorsqu'un 
mouvement syndical est puissant, non seulement il peut atteindre à un degré de partici-
pation efficace, mais, grâce aux pressions du gouvernement, limiter passablement le rôle 
de la multinationale. De même, la présence d'un mouvement syndical puissant, dans un 
pays où domine la démocratie sociale, comme en Israël et dans les pays Scandinaves, 
peut favoriser la coexistence sous un régime de participation ouvrière fort développé. 
Enfin, la puissance du mouvement syndical international peut exercer une influence sur 
la politique décisionnelle des entreprises multinationales. 
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